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Towards Meaningful Information Processing: A unifying 
representation for Peirce’s sign types 
 
 
Abstract An open problem in AI is the definition of meaningful information 
processing. That human interpretation and information processing by current 
computers can be different is well illustrated by Searle’s famous Chinese room 
argument thought experiment. In this paper we suggest that an answer to the 
above open problem of AI can be given by introducing a model of information 
processing which is embedded in a Peircean theory of (meaningful) signs. 
Peirce’s sign theory, that he systematically derived from his concept of a 
category, is seen by many as a theory of the knowable (the types of distinctions 
that can be signified by signs). We show that our model of information 
processing has the potential for representing three types of relation that are 
analogous to Peirce’s three classifications of sign, consisting of 10, 28, and 66 
elements.  
Keywords: information, human processing, Searle, sign theory, Peirce, process 
model 
 
1  Introduction 
In his famous Chinese room argument thought experiment (CRA), Searle has 
shown that computations by current computers can be qualitatively less 
meaningful than human interpretation. We may ask: Is it possible to model 
human interpretation as a process?  In this paper we suggest that the answer can 
be positive. Following the assumption that interpretation is related to a goal 
hence a process, we show that on the basis of an analysis of stimulus–reaction 
phenomena a model of human interpretation can be defined as a process 
(learning is beyond our current scope). By associating the events of that process 
with Peircean sign aspects we establish a relation between our model and 
Peirce’s theory of signs and interpretation. It is by virtue of this relation that we 
can posit our process as a model of meaningful information processing. Our 
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process oriented approach may be interesting from a semiotic perspective as 
well. Indeed, by offering an informational analysis to our model we are able to 
show its potential for a representation of three types of relation, consisting of 10 
(‘meaningful’), 28 (‘syntactic’), and 66 (‘semantic’) classes, which are analogous 
to Peirce’s three classifications of sign.  
The possibility of a process model of human interpretation may enable a 
paradigmatic change in human–computer interfacing. As Peirce’s sign theory is 
seen by many as a theory of the knowable (the types of distinctions that can be 
signified by signs), our model may facilitate the introduction of a novel approach 
in knowledge representation, natural language modeling, and problem 
specification. The possibility of a common representation for Peirce’s different 
classifications may open new perspectives in sign theoretical research as well 
(Weiss & Burks, 1945), (Farias & Queiroz, 2003), (Burch, 2011), (Sanders, 1970). 
The model suggested in this paper, and the relation between the used 
representation and Peirce’s sign aspects has been introduced earlier in (Sarbo, 
Farkas, & van Breemen, 2011), amongst others. The goal of this paper is to show 
that our model is able to represent the more complex concepts of Peircean sign 
theory as well. 
In past research, we experimentally tested that our theory is in line with 
human interpretation. To this end we developed models of information 
processing in different knowledge domains, such as the domain of natural 
language, ‘naive’ logic, and ‘naive’ reasoning. The test results showed that 
concepts generated by these models may be meaningful from a human 
perspective, as well. 
Our theory is remotely related to Situation Calculus (McCarthy & Hayes, 
1969). In our model, situations are represented by percepts (cf. sets of perceived 
qualities), fluents by elements of a percept, actions by relations between 









Note that ‘meaningful information’ (Vitanyi, 2006) and ‘meaningful 
information processing’ are not the same. The first is related to Shannon 
information2 and a distinction between useful regularity and redundancy 
(Adriaans, 2009), the second to information as stimulus and interpretation by the 
mind. Maybe the negligence of this difference explains to some extent the blind 
spot which information scientists have had in their approach to the importance 
of embedding information processing in a theory of signs. Curiously, in 
information theory the term meaningful may refer to a formal property, but also 
to a property of (human) processing. An example of the second is the Turing 
Test, which assumes the existence of an observer, capable of (re)cognizing 
intelligent hence meaningful communication. Notably the same concept is 
involved in Shannon’s concept of information as event probability, as well. 
Whereas the concept of probability is usually formally defined, not so the 
concept of an event which is related to conceptualization (how can we know that 
an event has occurred) hence to meaningfulness from an interpreter’s 
perspective. As knowledge may arise from (meaningful) interpretation through 
generalization, limitations caused by a lack of semiotic embedding may 
characterize traditional, formal knowledge representation too.  
The structure of this paper is the following. In Sect. 2, we introduce a 
model of information processing on the basis of an analysis of action–reaction 
phenomena. This is followed by an analysis of our model, from a ‘syntactic’, and 
a ‘semantic’ point of view, in Sect. 3–5. In Sect. 6 we elaborate on the relation 
between our model and Peirce’s different classifications of sign. We close the 
paper with a summary. 
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Following (Adriaans et al., 2010), Shannon information can be used to find an optimal 
compression for a sequence of messages. The related concept, Kolmogorov complexity can be 
used to define an ‘optimal’ probability distribution for a binary string: the universal distribution. 
Kolmogorov complexity and Shannon information seem to be dual notions: the shortest code for a 
binary string in the sense of Kolmogorov complexity is it’s optimal code in the sense of Shannon 








2  Action–reaction phenomena 
We assume that the goal of human interpretation is the generation of a response 
to (external) stimuli.3 On a physical level, stimuli appear as forces. A theory of 
forces can be found in Newton’s work (Newton, 1999/1687). In his 3rd law of 
motion he postulates: “For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction”. 
An illustrative example is a nail, hit by a hammer. Following Newton’s 2nd law, 
the applied force accelerates the nail much harder, by virtue of its smaller mass, 
than the reaction force accelerates the hammer. In the end, the nail may get 
deeply driven into the underlying piece of timber, while the hammer only gets 
slightly bounced back in the opposite direction. Newton’s 3nd law, in 
combination with the 2nd law, not only predicts the reaction force, but, in 
specific cases, also the possible consequences of the action, such as the driving 
of the nail. Remarkably, in Newton’s world, there are only action–reaction 
phenomena. This may explain why in everyday life the term reaction 
ambiguously denotes a force as well as the effects triggered by that force. 
From the point of view of information processing, Newton’s model of 
action–reaction phenomena may be conceived as too narrow: by knowing the 
applied force and the existing mass, everything else can be computed. Being 
neutral to the direction of time, this monadic model lacks the notion of a 
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Figure 1: A monadic (a), dyadic (b), and triadic (c) concept of action–reaction 
phenomena. A dashed line is used to express a dependency between events. A 
pair of nodes that can be merged into a single node is indicated by a dotted 
circle. 
 
If we are interested in the way in which reactions arise from actions, we 
may introduce the hypothesis that, in everyday phenomena, action and reaction 
are related to each other according to a relation of dependency. Assuming, for 
the moment, causal dependency, the result is a dyadic concept of action–
reaction phenomena. See Fig. 1(b). 
We may further refine our model by assuming that reactions arise from 
actions through an act of interpretation. Indeed, even at the physical level, the 
ability of objects to show different reactions to different actions may be seen as 
their potential for interpreting actions by ‘(re)cognizing’ them and ‘generating’ a 
reaction. Just as, in principle, physical objects involved in action–reaction 
phenomena must be independent (otherwise their co-occurrence cannot appear 
as a phenomenon), interpretation assumes the existence of knowledge about 
those objects and the possible consequence of their co-occurrence. For example, 
in our running example, the nail may be said to interpret the appearing force, by 
‘(re)cognizing’ its measure and ‘generating’ a counter force, as well as a 
diametral piercing movement. In sum, through the introduction of the concept of 
interpretation in our triadic model, the relation between action and reaction can 
be split into two relations: one between action and corresponding knowledge 
(recognition) and another between that knowledge and a corresponding reaction 
(generation), see Fig. 1(c).  
With the assumption of an involved dependency between action and 









2.1  Knowledge through internal processing 
In Newton’s world, action and reaction are unambiguously related to each other. 
Objects occurring in the Newtonian world simply do not have the potential of 
changing their ‘reaction strategy’. The ‘knowledge’ in the node ‘interpretation’ in 
Fig. 1(c) remains the same. What happens if we extend our focus and include in 
our model objects that do have the potential to acquire knowledge?  
Obviously, Newton’s 3rd law holds for such entities as well. However, the 
potential to generate more complex reactions enables the introduction of more 
refined models of action–reaction phenomena. Through memorization, the 
interpreting system obtains information about occurring action–reaction events 
that may prove useful in later interactions. If the interpreting system has the 
potential to observe itself and to memorize its observations,4 it will be able to 
distinguish information about external actions from the possible consequences 
those actions can bring about to the interpreting system. The latter kind of 
information may be called the system’s knowledge about itself. Through 
abstraction and generalization, the interpreting system may introduce concepts 
that can favorably be used to predict the consequences that appearing external 
qualities may have. This potential of the interpreting system to predict future 
events assumes an ability to cope with modalities other than the mechanical 
one, such as wave-type qualities, for instance, the observation of light rays in 
visual action–reaction phenomena: if we see the qualities of a hammer moving in 
our direction, we may step away, or shout, in order to prevent certain 
unfortunate mechanical effects. 
 
2.2  Two modes of operation 
Arguably, Newton’s theory considers action–reaction phenomena from the point 
of view of an external observer (external-view). If we are interested in the 
question of how interpretation may capitalize on memorized information for the 
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generation of reactions, we must switch perspective and analyze action–reaction 
phenomena from the stance of the interpreting system itself (internal-view). 
Following this stance, we suggest that the interpreting system occurring in some 
state is in interaction with the external force (quality).5 This external force 
appears as an effect in the interpreting system. The qualities of this state and 
effect will be called the input state and effect qualities or, briefly, input qualities. 
The relation between this state and effect is the ground for the reaction 
generated by the observer. 
   
Figure 2: Informational relation underlying interpretation (a), matching mode 
operation (b), and analysis mode operation (c). A continuous line is used to 
represent a flow of emerging information, not just a dependency. ‘K’ stands for 
the observer’s knowledge 
 
The aforementioned interaction is stored by the interpreting system in a 
collection of (unanalyzed) ‘input’, ‘state’, ‘effect’ and (interrelated) ‘state–effect’ 
qualities. These ‘storing events’, which come down to establishing relations, are 
all triggered by the external force (‘action’). Interpretation can be successful only 
if these events consistently match memorized information. This informational 
relation underlying the generation of reactions is depicted in Fig. 2(a). A 
schematic model of the corresponding ‘matching’ mode operation of 
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 External-view representation is possible also in this case. By considering the external force to be 
a representation of a phenomenon, the observer may be able to derive hypotheses about the 








information processing is depicted in Fig. 2(b). For example, the ‘state’ can be 
defined by the mass and the velocity of the nail and the hammer, the ‘effect’ by 
the change in their velocities. 
Note that all ‘storing events’ included in Fig. 2(b) are internal. They are 
related to the occurring action and reaction, which are external. The latter 
relations are expressed by means of dashed lines, connecting the nodes ‘action’ 
and ‘reaction’ via the nodes ‘input’, ‘state’, ‘effect’ and ‘state-effect’ relation, 
refining our model in the node ‘interpretation’, in Fig. 1(c).  
We assume that, through generalization, perceived data obtained in past 
experiences may be transformed into knowledge. In the case of indeterminate 
input qualities the generation of a state–effect relation may require an analysis 
of all possible matches, e.g., in a cyclic fashion,6 as well as the selection of a 
solution, on the basis of some strategy. As part of this analysis, different 
interpretations of the input state (cf. ‘state’) and effect (cf. ‘effect’) as well as 
their relation (cf. ‘state-effect’) can be generated internally by means of the 
system’s knowledge about corresponding state and effect qualities. 
Following the above considerations, a model of action–reaction 
phenomena can be derived as follows. By considering the input state and effect 
qualities to be external (cf. effect), in relation to the system’s knowledge which is 
internal (cf. state), the interaction between the state and effect qualities on the 
one hand, and the system’s knowledge on the other can be modeled by two 
instances of a ‘matching’ mode process. As the observer’s knowledge is shared 
by those process instances, it can be represented by a single node (‘K’). In 
Fig. 2(c) the two sub-processes (represented by a pair of structures consisting of 
four nodes) are marked by the labels state and effect. Note that the above 
‘internal’ refinement of our model (in the nodes ‘state’ and ‘effect’, in Fig. 2(b)) 
does not affect the dependency between ‘action’ and ‘reaction’ (cf. dashed 
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lines).7 In Fig. 2(c), the nodes between ‘action’ and ‘reaction’ represent the nine 
types of relation involved in action–reaction phenomena. 
By the introduction of analysis and selection in the interpretation process, 
the possibility of anticipatory responses and habit formation are added to the 
mechanistic Newtonian model.  
 
3  Informational analysis 
What information is necessary for the nine types of relation of our model of 
action–reaction phenomena?  Following the analysis presented in the previous 
section, the interpreting system must have information about: 
 
1. Potential relational properties of qualities involved in an input interaction (in 
order to  be able to perceive the input as a co-occurrence of a state and 
effect) 
2. Actual relational properties of qualities involved in an observed change (in 
order to be able to interpret co-occurring state and effect qualities as 
‘constituents’ of a relation) 
3. Properties of relations involved in an observed phenomenon (in order to be 
able to interpret the input as a relation between a perceived state and 
effect). 
 
For instance, that a nail and a hammer have kinetic properties, which are a 
potential for a relation (1), that a nail can be in relation with a hammer by 
resisting its effect, and a hammer can be in relation with a nail by affecting its 
state (2), and that a nail and a hammer having certain kinetic properties, may 
establish a relation between a diametral force and counter force (3). 
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How can we know about the three types of information?  The Newtonian 
world can be defined by a set of action–reaction phenomena, which implies that 
only action-reaction phenomena can be observed hence, from an informational 
stance, only relations (3) can be experienced. Actual relational properties (2) 
must be derived from perceived relations (3), and potential properties (1) from 
those actual relational properties (2). The other way round, potential properties 
(1) must underly actual relational properties (2), and those the properties of 
perceived relations (3). For instance, from the experience of a reaction (3), we 
may derive the existence of a relation between a state and effect (2), and from 
that relation, a co-occurrence of certain kinetic qualities (1).  
Information about qualities may enable an interpretation of co-occurring 
qualities as a relation, involved in the observed phenomenon. An example is a 
co-occurrence of a nail and a hammer, interpreted as ‘nail-driving’. Note that 
interpretation requires knowledge about possible co-occurrences of qualities 
that can be experienced as a phenomenon, hence are meaningful. 
The granularity of information may depend on the resolution by the 
interpreting system. In this paper we assume finite resolution and the existence 
of a mapping of qualities, which are a continuum, to discrete values called 
qualia.8 Below, we use the terms quality and qualia interchangeably. 
Postulating the existence of three types of information enables action–
reaction phenomena to be interpreted as a process, combining qualities involved 
in an interaction into a relation. 
 
3.1  Categories and types of information 
In this section we will settle on the idea that the three types of information may 
coincide with the three categories of information involved in phenomena. 
According to Peirce, phenomena can be distinguished in three categories, that he 
consequently called firstness, secondness, and thirdness: 
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The first is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything nor 
lying behind anything. The second is that which is what it is by force of 
something to which it is second. The third is that which is what it is owing to 
things between which it mediates and which it brings into relation to each 
other (CP: 2.356)  
 
An example of firstness are qualities in themselves, e.g., nail, hammer. An 
example of secondness are (ad-hoc) relations between qualities, e.g., a co-
occurrence of a nail and a hammer. An example of thirdness are habitual 
(meaningful) relations of qualities, e.g., a co-occurrence of a nail and a hammer 
(known) as ‘nail-driving’. Another example, this time in the context of the CRA, is 
the perception of an input string as a quality (cf. firstness), as a sequence of 
words in some language (cf. secondness), and a sentence in a familiar language 
(cf. thirdness). In the first case, the reaction can be a copying of the input (cf. 
impression), in the second case, the generation of a syntactic parsing, in the third 
case, the establishing of a meaningful interpretation. 
The three categories are related to each other according to a relation of 
dependency: categories of a higher ordinal number involve a lower order 
category. A distinguishing property of the Peircean categorical schema is that 
thirdness can only be experienced, firstness may only appear through 
secondness, and secondness only through thirdness.9 This subservience relation 
of the three categories implies that categories of a lower ordinal number evolve 
to hence need a higher order category. The two relations share the property that 
they are reflexive and transitive. Below we refer to the two types of dependency 
between categories by the relations ‘involve’ (‘≥’) and ‘evolve’ (‘≤’).  
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We suggest that the three types of information of qualities, introduced in 
the previous section, are analogous to the three classes of a categorical 
definition of information involved in phenomena, as mentioned above: 
1. data: information involved in a quality in itself, such as its potential for 
arelation (cf. firstness) 
2. connection: information involved in a relation of a quality with another 
quality, such as its actual relational properties (cf. secondness) 
3. relation: information involved in a quality, establishing a relation, such as its 
habitual properties (cf. thirdness). 
By considering the dependency between the Peircean categories to be an 
expression of a development, the three classes of information can be interpreted 
as stages of an informational process, generating a relation (cf. reaction) 
involved in the input action. We assume that information of a higher class 
involves information of a lower class, and the other way around, information of a 
lower class needs information of a higher class it is evolving to. For instance, 1≤2: 
a potential relational property may become operational only through an actual 
relation; and 3≥2: an arising relation involves an actual relation between qualia. 
An example, in the context of the CRA, are the relations involved in the 
interpreting system’s potential for generating a copy of the input (1), for 
analyzing it syntactically (2), and in a meaningful fashion (3). 
By establishing a link between categories and types of information, which 
are relations, we open the way for a relational interpretation of action–reaction 
phenomena. 
 
4  Relational interpretation 
From a categorical perspective, qualities involved in an interaction must be 
independent (cf. firstness). The reaction, which arises through interpretation, 
must involve a qualitative change (cf. thirdness). From this we may conclude that 









An example of qualities involved in an interaction are a nail and hammer; 
an example of a qualitative change is the arising force and counter force. 
Another example, this time in the domain of wave-type phenomena, are 
interacting wave signals (cf. qualities), and an arising standing wave (cf. a 
qualitative change). 
From an informational stance, an interaction can be characterized by a pair 
of qualities (q1, q2), the reaction by the quality of the arising force and counter 
force (q3). As information involved in each one of the 3 qualities can be 
distinguished in 3 classes (cf. stages), we suggest that information involved in 
action–reaction phenomena can be represented by 3*3*3=27 possible relations 
or combinations of information stages; the arising phenomenon itself by the 
combination corresponding to the ‘arising’ relation (which can be any one of 
those possible relations). As an observation is always related to some 
perspective by the observer, the ‘arising’ relation must involve information about 
a selection from the 27 combinations. By virtue of this information, the ‘arising’ 
relation must be different from those possible relations.  
In sum, we suggest that action–reaction phenomena can be characterized 
by 27+1=28 types of relation. According to our model, those relations must be 
involved in the interaction between q1 and q2. Information about the reaction, 
involved in q3, may enable a novel interpretation of the existing relations, but no 
introduction of relations independent from q1 and q2 (the existence of such 
relations would imply that representation by the observer may not be truthful). 
 
4.1  Internal-view representation 
Although from the point of view of interaction, the observer can be identical to 
one of the interacting qualities, from the stance of interpretation, the observer 
may represent the input interaction from the perspective of any one of the two 








q2 is affecting q1, that we will call effect-, and state-view, respectively.10 By 
virtue of the isomorphism between the two perspectives, their relations can be 
merged into a single representation. We will return to this point in Sect. 5, in 
which we incorporate in our model a representation of q3, as well.  
Below, we elaborate on an effect-view interpretation (q1 is affecting q2). 
Conform this perspective, the two qualia are interpreted differently: q1 as an 
expression of the input effect, q2 as an expression of a relation of the input state 
with the input effect. The three classes of relational information involved in q2 
can be defined as follows (see Fig. 3): 
(1) independent: an expression of the relation of q2 with q1, as a co-occurrence 
of independent qualia (cf. firstness) 
(2) co-existing: an expression of the relation of q2 with q1 , as a co-existence of 
interrelated qualia (cf. secondness) 
(3) corresponding: an expression of  the relation of q2 with q1,  as  a 
correspondence of qualia (cf. thirdness). 
Following the dependency between the categories (see Sect. 3.1), the 
above classes are related to one another: (1)≤(2)≤(3) and (3)≥(2)≥(1) where ‘≤’ 
and ‘≥’ are used as polymorphic operators. 
As q2 and q1 are commonly interpreted from the perspective of q1, their 
information can be merged into a single representation. The three up-right 
diagonals depicted in this diagram represent q1 from the perspective of firstness, 
secondness, and thirdness, according to q2, that we call the three 
representations of q1. The terminology used in Fig. 3, as well as below, complies 
with the terminology used in (Sarbo et al., 2011).  
(1) First representation of  q1 according to q2  
neutral=independent∗data: an expression of the input qualia as neutral 
relational properties or a potential for a relation 
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passive=independent∗connection: an expression of the input qualia as 
passive  relational properties enabling an actual relation 
active=independent∗relation: an expression of the input qualia as active 
relational properties involved in a habitual relation  
An example are independent qualia of an interaction appearing as data (cf. 
neutral); the potential of q1 for a relation with an independent other quality, 
represented by q2 (cf. passive); and the habitual properties of a relation involved 
in q1, in combination with a type of qualia represented by q2 (cf. active). 
(2) Second representation of q1 according to q2 
constituent=co-existing∗data: an expression of the input qualia as 
constituents of  a potential relation 
modifier=co-existing∗connection: an expression of the input qualia as 
passive  constituents enabling an actual relation 
predicate=co-existing∗relation: an expression of the input qualia as 
interrelated active constituents involved in a habitual relation 
An example, in syntactic language phenomena, are co-existent words of an input 
string, appearing as data (cf. constituent); syntactic modifiers, connecting to their 
arguments (cf. modifier); and verb phrases, predicating the subject of the 
sentence (cf. predicate). 
(3) Third representation of q1 according to q2  
abstract=corresponding∗data: an expression of the input qualia as abstract 
properties involved in a potential relation 
structure=corresponding∗connection: an expression of the input qualia as 
interrelated properties involved in an actual relation 
binding=corresponding∗relation: an expression of the input qualia as an 
amalgamation of properties involved in a habitual relation. 
An example, this time in wave-type phenomena, are corresponding signals of a 
wave phenomenon, abstracted as longitudinal or transversal wave-forms (cf. 








structure); and a relation of wave signals, appearing as a standing wave, 
characterized by an arising new wave pattern (cf. binding). 
By combining information from q2 and q1 into a single representation, we 
lay the ground for an informational analysis of our model of action–reaction 
phenomena. 
 
Figure 3: Combined state and effect information in effect-view interpretation. 
The three up-right diagonals illustrate the three representations of q1 (according 
to q2) 
 
5  Information structures 
The goal of this section is to show that the 27+1 combinations of information 
stages can be represented by relations enabled by q2 and q1. Our model is 
categorically inspired. We show that those relations, as well as the operations 
generating them, exhibit the properties of the three categories. Following this 
line of thought we assume that, from an informational stance, action–reaction 
phenomena must involve ternary relations between three qualities (cf. 
thirdness), binary relations between a pair of qualities (cf. secondness), and 
unary relations of qualities to themselves (cf. firstness). As, in effect-view, the 
observed phenomenon is represented by information involved in q1, in the 
relation between q2 and q1, and in the relation between q3, q2 and q1, we 
assume that the 27+1 combinations of information stages is represented by 
unary relations of q1 to itself, binary relations between q2 and q1, and ternary 








quality, we assume that q3 can be represented by merging information involved 
in q2 and q1.  
We suggest that unary, binary, and ternary relations between qualities can 
be represented by relations between stages from a single, a pair of, and all three 
representations of q1, respectively. By virtue of their categorical foundation, 
relations between information stages must respect the dependency between 
categories. We call this the condition of categorical dependency. For example, a 
secondness category information stage can be in an ‘involve’ relation (‘≥’) with 
firstness and secondness category information stage(s) only. Below we begin 
with an analysis of unary and binary relations. We return to ternary relations in 
Sect. 5.1.3.  
 
5.1  Syntactic structures 
In order to introduce an informational analysis of our representation, we embed 
the set of stages of a quality into the ordered set of integers S={1,2,3}. For 
i∈{1,2}, we define:  qi =〈S,≤〉. We represent the set of relations enabled by q2 and 
q1 by the operation lattice multiplication (Davey & Priestley,1990). In this 
section, we restrict ourselves to an analysis of the relations represented by the 
Hasse-diagram of the arising ordering,11 that we refer to by the symbol ‘q2*q1’. 
We allow ‘≤’ to designate the relations ‘involve’ and ‘evolve’, ambiguously. We 
call an element of the set underlying q2*q1 a stage.12 A stage of q2*q1 can be 
referred to by its coordinates ‘(i)j’, designating stage ‘j’ of q1, from the ‘i’th 
perspective, according to q2. For instance, (3)1 designates stage 1 of q1, from 
the perspective of 3rdness, according to q2. See also Fig. 4. Elements of q2*q1, 
that are relations, can be referred to by a pair of coordinates, separated by a 
hyphen symbol, for instance, (3)1-(3)2. Reference to a set of relations can be 
abbreviated. For example, (3)1-(3)2-(2)2 is short for {(3)1-(3)2, (3)2-(2)2}. 
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The Hasse diagram of a lattice L is a representation of a minimal relation generating L by means 
of a closure operation. 








                           
Figure 4: A representation of q2*q1. Stages of q2*q1 are labelled by a pair of 
integers, representing the category of a stage of q2 (in parentheses) and a stage 
of q1. Stages of q2 are used as (relational) representations of a stage of q1. For 
example, (3)1 designates stage 1 of q1, from a 3rdness perspective according to 
q2. This convention is used in later diagrams as well. 
 
In order to achieve our goal set in the beginning of Sect. 5, we derive decom-
positions of q2*q1. In the case of unary relations (cf. firstness) this boils down to 
decompositions of q1 (Birkhoff & Bartee, 1970). In our categorically inspired 
analysis we restrict ourselves to decompositions that are homogeneous hence 
can be characterized by a single type or category. We define a homogeneous 
decomposition of a relation R, as follows: R=  i=1,k (ri r),  for r⊆R, k≥1, and ri∩rj 
=∅ for i≠j. The equivalence class r is also called a unit relation. By virtue of the 
two orderings (cf. ‘involve’ and ‘evolve’), r has two versions. We assume that a 
single version of r is defined by one of the order relations only. In the diagrams of 
this section, relations are represented by undirected edges (information about 
ordering is omitted). 
In our analysis we always begin with the smallest unit relation of a kind 
(unary, binary, and ternary), from which we develop new unit relations (and 
decompositions) by means of three functions on relations:13 (1) identity, (2) 
composition, (3) recursion. Identity (1) enables a definition of instances of r in R. 
Composition (2) is a function on instances of r. By virtue of the existence of the 
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two order relations, this operation has two versions, combination and 
complementation, enabling a composition of instances of r, having identical and 
different orderings, respectively. Finally, recursion (3) enables an introduction of 
a new interpretation of a relation. This function has three versions: transitive 
closure, encapsulation, and merging. Encapsulation enables a subset of R to be 
interpreted as an element of an ordering. A pair of such elements are considered 
to be in relation if they include a shared element of R. Merging introduces a 
conceptually new interpretation for R.  
Note the categorical nature of the three functions above. Identity operates 
on a singleton relation (cf. firstness), composition on a pair of subsets of a 
relation (cf. secondness), recursion on subsets underlying a new concept (cf. 
thirdness). Also note the analogy between these functions, and the functions 
used by a mathematical theory of categories (Barr & Wells, 1990).  
We call a homogeneous decomposition of R a conceptualization, an 
instance of r an information structure. In our analysis, trivial decompositions 
(r∈R) are omitted. As the structures revealed by our analysis do not represent 
information involved in q3, they can be called syntactic structures.  
An example, in geometry, are the different decompositions of a 
quadrangle, defined by a relation between four points and edges. By considering 
a point and a pair of edges which it is incident to be a single relation (cf. identity), 
the quadrangle can be recursively conceptualized (cf. encapsulation) as a relation 
between four angles (cf. merging). By combining the relations representing a pair 
of complementary angles into a single relation (cf. complementation), the 
quadrangle can be conceptualized as a couple of pairs of angles (Sarbo, 1996).  
5.1.1  Unary structures 
The smallest unary unit relation is defined by the relation of an information stage 
of q1. See Fig. 5(a). The corresponding unary decomposition of q1 is a trivial one. 
A more interesting unit relation can be found through composition and transitive 
closure. See Fig. 5(b). A homogeneous decomposition of the three 








Fig. 5(c). An application of both versions of the above unit relation do not enable 
new conceptualizations, different from the existing ones. Unary informations 
structures satisfy the condition of categorical dependency, trivially. 
The number of unary information structures is: 3. 
 
 
Figure 5: Unit relations enabling a trivial (a), and a non-trivial unary 
decomposition of q1 (b). The three unary information structures (c) generated by 
unit relation (b). Bullets of a lighter grey shade stand for stages of q1 that are 
closed. Dotted lines are used for an expression of the three representations of 
q1, as firstness category relations involved in q2*q1. 
 
5.1.2  Binary structures 
The smallest binary unit relation is defined by the pair of relations of an 
information stage of q2*q1. The two versions of this relation are displayed in 
Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(b). An instance of the first version is (2)1-(1)1-(1)2. A 
homogeneous decomposition of q2*q1 into binary information structures is 
depicted in Fig. 7(a), by small ‘triangles’. 14  Instances of the two versions of the 
unit relation, ordered by ‘evolve’ (‘≤’) and ‘involve’ (‘≥’), are represented by 
‘triangles’ pointing downward and upward, respectively. Through composition 
(cf. combination) and transitive closure, q2*q1 can be conceptualized as a set of 
large ‘triangles’. See Fig. 7(b). 
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Figure 6: The two versions of the used binary unit relation, ordered by ‘evolve’ 
(a) and ‘involve’ (b). A sample binary information structure (c), and the closure of 
a composition of binary information structures (d). A filling pattern is used for an 
illustration of binary structures as ‘triangles’ 
 
By combining a pair of small ‘triangles’ into a single relation (cf. 
complementation), we may conceptualize q2*q1 as a set of small ‘quadrangles’. 
See Fig. 8(a). An example is the complementation of (2)1-(1)1-(1)2 by (2)1-(2)2-
(1)2, obtaining (2)1-(2)2-(1)2-(1)1. Considering small ‘quadrangles’ to be a single 
element (cf. encapsulation), enables q2*q1 to be recursively conceptualized as a 
large ‘quadrangle’ (cf. merging). See Fig. 8(b). Binary information structures 
satisfy the condition of categorical dependency, trivially. For example, in Fig. 6(c), 
(1)1≤(2)1 and (1)1≤(1)2, as (1)≤(2) and 1≤1, and (1)≤(1) and 1≤2, respectively. 
The number of binary information structures is: (8+2)+(4+1)= 15. 
 
 










Figure 8: A conceptualization of q2*q1 as small (a) and large ‘quadrangles’ (b). 
Edges representing relations arising through closure, are omitted (e.g., in (a), 
(1)1-(2)2, and in (b), (1)1-(3)3) 
 
5.1.3  Ternary structures 
Ternary relations are relations between q3, q2, and q1. From an analytical 
perspective, q3 (cf. reaction) must involve information about q2 and q1, as well 
as about itself. However, binary relations enabled by q2*q1 may represent 
information involved in q2 and q1 only. We may capture the above completeness 
of q3, by defining ternary relations to include information from all three 
representations of q1 (according to q2). As a result, we may define the smallest 
ternary unit relation to be a relation between a single information stage from 
each one of the three representations of q1. An instance of this unit relation is 
defined by the information stages (3)1, (2)1, (1)2. 
We represent ternary information structures by triples. To this end, we 
assume the existence of an order preserving mapping between the three 
categories and the three positions of a triple. This way we ensure that, in a triple, 
the condition of categorical dependency for stages from q2 is respected. In 
addition we require that the above condition is respected by the stages of q1, 
occurring in the three positions of a triple. We use the convention that a triple 
‘(i,j,k)’ stands for the ternary relation (3)i-(2)j-(1)k, for 1≤ i, j, k ≤3. For example, 








categorical dependency, as 1≤2≤2. An example of a triple which does not satisfy 
that condition is (2,1,1).  
A homogeneous decomposition of q2*q1 into ternary information 
structures is defined by the set: {(1,1,1), (1,1,2), (1,2,2), (2,2,2), (1,1,3), (1,2,3), 
(2,2,3), (1,3,3), (2,3,3), (3,3,3)}, which is a strict lexicographic ordering. See Fig. 9. 
In this diagram, stages occurring in a ternary relation are connected by edges (cf. 
relations between information stages). An application of both versions of the 
above unit relation, as well as the use of the operations, composition and 
recursion,15 enable no new decompositions. Note, in Fig. 9, the existence of 
‘horizontal’ edges, e.g., (2)1-(1)2, which explains our earlier representation of 
binary information structures by means of triangles, in Fig. 7.  




Figure 9: Ternary information structures depicted by edges between stages 
occurring in the three positions of a triple (a). The involved set of relations (b) 
and ‘horizontal’ dependencies (c) 
 
Following the analysis of this section we conclude that the number of unary, 
binary, and ternary information structures involved in q2*q1 is: (3+15+10)= 28. 
Note the categorical nature of the three types of structures. Unary information 
structures are independent (cf. firstness), binary information structures are 
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related to one another, but their relation is not an ordering (cf. secondness), 
ternary information structures are related and their relation defines an induced 
ordering (cf. thirdness). Also note that, from a formal perspective, the set of 
decompositions of q2*q1 introduced in this section is not complete. 
Decompositions that are not mentioned are not categorically founded hence are 
not considered to be representations of action–reaction phenomena. 
The relations introduced in this section are an expression of a co-existence 
of information stages. As, from an analytical point of view, action–reaction 
phenomena merge the qualities of an interaction into a single quality (cf. 
reaction), we are interested in relations expressing a combination of information 
involved in qualities of a phenomenon. An analysis of such relations, represented 
by q2*q1, is the subject of the next section. 
 
 
Figure 10: Relations in effect- (a) and state-view interpretation (b), and the set of 
relations obtained through merging (c) 
 
5.2  Semantic structures 
The set of relations generated by the two perspectives of interpretation, q1 is 
affecting q2 (effect-view) and q2 is affecting q1 (state-view), are isomorphic. See 
Fig. 10(a) and Fig. 10(b). Although in a single observation, the observer may 
develop one of the two interpretations only, we assume that through 
memorization, relations from the two perspectives can be merged into a single 
representation by the observer (this requires that one of the two representations 








diagram, the existence of an edge between (1)1 and (3)3, and the absence16 of 
one between (3)1 and (1)3. See also Fig. 8. 
The potential of the observer to consider phenomena to be interactions 
between some state and effect, is independent from its potential to merge 
information from different interpretations, through memorization. We assume 
that, in a single observation, the observer may develop one of the two possible 
views of interpretation in the presence of memory information too. How can we 
comply with this condition of our model?  
By analyzing the relations, displayed in Fig. 10(c), we may observe that 
there are two relations, (2)1-(3)2 and (1)2-(2)3, which are an expression of a 
combined growth of categorical information involved in q2 and q1 hence can be 
used for distinguishing between two perspectives of interpretation. As (2)1-(3)2 
is an expression of an increase of information of the state (q2), from secondness 
to thirdness (this is opposed to an increase of information of the effect (q1), from 
firstness to secondness, which is less meaningful), this relation can be associated 
with state-view interpretation. For symmetry reasons, (1)2-(2)3, expressing an 
increase of information of the effect, can be associated with effect-view 
interpretation.17 In sum, we assume that ‘state-view’ interpretation is 
characterized by the presence of (2)1-(3)2 and the absence of (1)2-(2)3; effect-
view interpretation by the presence (1)2-(2)3 of and the absence of (2)1-(3)2. 
See Fig. 11. 
By re-introducing the two views of interpretation, the possibility of an 
analysis of relations representing a combination of information from different 
perspectives comes into sight.  
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This is a consequence of the ‘V’-shape relations underlying small ‘triangles’ (cf. Sect. 5.1.2). 
17
(1)1-(2)2, (2)2-(3)3, and (1)1-(3)3 do not represent an increase of categorical information 
specific for q2, or q1; (2)1-(1)3, (3)1-(2)3, etc., do not represent a combined growth of categorical 









Figure 11: Relations in state- (a) and effect-view interpretation (b) 
 
5.3  Octahedron representation 
In order to expose our relations as an expression of information combination, we 
offer a transformation to our representation, depicted in Fig. 11. We illustrate 
this for state-view interpretation, shown in Fig. 11(a). Relations enabling a 
combination of information from different perspectives of q1 must be relations 
between stages that are categorically different18 (relations between information 
stages that are different in one of their q2, or q1 coordinates only, have been 
considered already by our analysis). These are the ‘crossing’ relations, (3)2-(1)3, 
(3)1-(1)2, (2)1-(1)3, (3)1-(2)3, and the ‘vertical’ relations, (2)1-(3)2, (1)1-(2)2, 
(2)2-(3)3 and (1)1-(3)3. For example, in (3)2-(1)3, (3) and (1), as well as 2 and 3, 
are categorically different. An example of a relation that does not satisfy our 
needs is (3)2-(2)2. 
An essential element of our transformation is a combination of information 
from a pair of stages of a relation into a single stage. As a result, the edge 
connecting the two stages can be removed. We illustrate our transformation for 
(3)1-(1)2 and (3)2-(1)3. Through merging them into (1)2 and (1)3, respectively, 
information shared by the relations (3)1-(2)2 and (3)2-(2)2 may get lost (cf. 
information ‘coordinated’ by (2)2). In order to keep the represented information 
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invariant, we introduce an identical copy of (2)2, as shown in Fig. 12(a).19 As (1)1 
and (3)3 are in relation with (2)2, the relations (1)1-(2)2 and (2)2-(3)3 can be 
replaced by (1)1-(2)2 and (2)2-(3)3. A stepwise transformation of the relations in 
Fig. 11(a) is illustrated by Fig. 12(b)-(d). A transformation of the relations in 
Fig. 11(b) is depicted in Fig. 13. 
 
 
Figure 12: A transformation of relations in state-view interpretation. In (a)–(c), 
stages and edges involved in merging are given in italics, and by dotted lines, 
respectively. In (d), vertices are labelled by an expression on stages; combination 
of information is designated by ‘_’ . The number of instances of a stage can be 
given by a superscript, for example, (2)33_(3)1 designates a combination of 
information from 3 instances of (2)3 and a single instance of (3)1. Grey shade and 
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A copy is required as coordination may refer to all information represented by (2)2. Note that 
information is idempotent for addition. Stages involved in information combination are given in 








Figure 13: A transformation of relations in effect-view interpretation (a) into an 
octahedron (b) 
 
5.4  Cyclic information processing 
The category of information obtained through combination can be distinguished 
in two types: ‘and’- and ‘or’-type. For example, firstness type information, 
designated by ‘1’, is ‘and’-type in (1)1, by virtue of occurrences of ‘1’ in both 
coordinates; and ‘or’-type in (1)2-(3)1, because of occurrences of ‘1’ in different 
coordinates. This way, vertices of the octahedron can be labelled by their 
categorical type of information. We elaborate this for ‘effect-view’ 
representation, depicted in Fig. 13. In our presentation below, superscripts of a 
stage are omitted (cf. idempotence of information). We represent the categorical 
type of information of a vertex by an expression, in which ‘and’-, and ‘or’-type 
occurrences of a category are separated by a ‘*’, and ‘+’ symbol, respectively. 
(1)1_(2)2_(3)3:   1∗2∗3 
(2)1_(1)3:    1 
(2)3_(1)2:   2 
(3)2_(1)3:   3 
(3)1_(1)2)_(2)3:  1+2+3 
(2)2_(2)2_(2)2_(2)2:  2∗2∗2∗2 
In the case of indeterminate input, the interpreting system may have to 
consider all possible interpretations, one by one, in a cyclic fashion. Cyclic 
operation can be modelled by mapping the vertices of the octahedron to the 
nodes of our Newtonian model of action–reaction phenomena. The vertex 
labelled by 2*2*2*2 can be mapped to the node ‘action’, by virtue of the 
meaning of a pointer involved in secondness (cf. 2) and the potential of the node 
‘action’ for a presentation of qualia of a (next) input phenomenon. The vertex 








completeness of thirdness20 and the potential of the node ‘reaction’ to combine 
information from all three qualities. The other four vertices can be mapped to 
the four nodes of our Newtonian model, as well as to stages of q2*q1, as follows. 
See also Fig. 14. 
1: state, (3)1; abstract input state, representing the potential for a relation with 
any effect (cf. firstness) 
2: state–effect, (3)3; binding, between the input state and effect, representing a 
relation (cf. secondness) 
3: effect, (1)3; abstract input effect, representing the potential for a habitual  
relation with a type of input state which is involved (cf. thirdness) 
1+2+3: input, (1)1; input state and effect, representing a collection of qualia (cf. 




Figure 14: A recap of our Newtonian model of interpretation (a), cf. Fig. 2(c), and 
a cyclic process interpretation of the octahedron (b), cf. Fig. 13 (which is clock-
wise rotated by 90o). In (b), a vertex can be labelled by a stage and a categorical 
type of information separated by a colon symbol 
 
By transforming our relations into an octahedron and through making use of the 
mapping above, the cutting plane of the octahedron can be interpreted as an 
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instance of ‘matching’ mode operation. If the generated relations do not enable 
this mode of operation, the interpreting system may switch to ‘analysis’ mode, in 
order to generate other relations, by means of the interpreting system’s 
knowledge, eventually enabling a matching of the (augmented) input qualia.  
 
5.5  Relations re-presented 
Our mapping, displayed in Fig. 14(b), reveals the possibility of the cutting plane 
of the next cycle to be ‘primed’ by information from the previous cycle. It also 
reveals the potential of this structure to be interpreted as an instance of q2*q1. 
Following our analysis, in Sect. 5, q2*q1 enables a representation of 28 syntactic 
structures. According to our Newtonian model, those structures must be in 
relation with the nodes, ‘action’ and ‘reaction’. From these premises we 
conclude that, through considering relations to be expressions of information 
combination, the octahedron structure can be interpreted as a representation of 
2*28 structures. By virtue of the potential of the nodes, ‘action’ and ‘reaction’, 
for a representation of properties of the interpreting system itself, those 
structures can be called semantic structures. 
In Sect. 2 we have shown that our Newtonian model can be interpreted as 
a representation of relations between the three qualities involved in action–
reaction phenomena. The nodes ‘action’, and ‘reaction’, are an expression of this 
relation as a firstness, and a thirdness, respectively; the cutting plane as a 
representation of the same relation as a secondness. By virtue of the 
dependency between the cutting plane, and the nodes ‘action’, and ‘reaction’, 
the two sets of 28 semantic structures (cf. 2*28) can be said to represent a 
relation between firstness and secondness (‘action’–cutting plane), and between 
secondness and thirdness (cutting plane–‘reaction’), respectively.  
Earlier we represented ternary relations by syntactic structures (cf. triples), 
in which a position is filled by information from a single perspective of q1 (cf. 
firstness). Later we introduced a representation of ternary relations by semantic 








of q1 (cf. secondness). Eventually we define a third type of (triadic) ternary 
relation, in which a position is defined by information from all three perspectives 
of q1. We assume that triadic (‘meaningful’) ternary information structures are in 
relation with the nodes ‘action’ and ‘reaction’, both. As a result we may extend 
the set of semantic structures by 10 triadic structures, one of which representing 
the ‘arising’ relation generated by the interpreting system. 
The number of semantic structures is: 2*28+10= 66.  
 
  
Figure 15: An overview of the types of relation used by our model 
 
In summary, relational information is represented by our model in three ways 
(see Fig. 15) by 28 syntactic structures (information from a single representation 
of q1), 2*28 semantic structures (information from a pair of representations of 
q1), and 10 triadic structures (information from all three representations of q1). 
To this end, we introduced three types of relation (unary, binary, ternary), and 
within that classification we made a distinction between three types of 
representation. Relations of the first type represent information stages of a 
category in themselves (cf. unary, binary, ternary relations); relations of the 
second type are an expression of a combination of information from a pair of 
categories (cf. binary and ternary relations); relations of the third type represent 
a merging of information from all three categories (cf. ternary relations). Note 
that unary relations have a single type, binary relations two types, and ternary 








An interesting property of q1*q1 is that its number of elements is 12, 
enabling a definition of 66 pairs (cf. binary relations).21 This may be considered to 
be an expression of the potential of q1*q2 for a formal representation of action–
reaction phenomena.  
A representation of meaningful interpretation is beyond our possibilities. In 
line with Peircean semiotics, we assume that interpretation22 involves an 
irreducible triadic relation between the three qualities of action–reaction 
phenomena. This may explain why triadic (‘meaningful’) ternary relations have 
been introduced as a subset of semantic relations. 
 
6  Peircean sign relations 
The goal of this section is to show that our model of action–reaction phenomena 
is congruent with Peirce’s theory of signs. To this end, we generalize the concept 
of an interaction in the concept of a sign, and present action–reaction 
phenomena as sign interpretation processes. 
 
6.1  Categories, signs, and sign aspects 
Fundamental notions in Peircean theory are his three categories of phenomena: 
firstness, secondness, and thirdness. An example of the three categories, in the 
domain of signs, is the quality of pain (firstness), the relation of pain with its 
object, e.g., toothache (secondness), and the relation between pain and its 
interpreting thought by some agent, e.g., “call a dentist” (thirdness).23 
By analyzing his concept of a sign along categorical lines, Peirce concluded 
that all signs must involve nine sign aspects. Note that sign aspects are different 
from signs. They may be characterized as potential signs, that are becoming a 
sign. This difference between signs and sign aspects can be illustrated by the 
phenomenon of apparent motion perception. In this phenomenon, a series of 





From a semiotic perspective, interpretation is always meaningful. 
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steady pictures (cf. sign aspect) are presented. Although each picture can be 
meaningful in itself, combined they can be interpreted as parameters in the 
experience of the entire series of pictures as motion (cf. sign).  
The nine sign aspects can be introduced by a triadic (sub-)classification of 
the sign’s relations. We call the category of a sub-class a categorical aspect, the 
relation between sub-classes of a triad a categorical relation. Below, we 
introduce a sign aspectual characterization of the sign’s primary relations: the 
relation of the sign to itself, to its object, and its interpretant. As a consequence 
of the dynamical nature of successions of sign aspects (cf. steady pictures), we 
illustrate them by means of signs (cf. motion). We designate categories by 
integers, e.g., firstness by ‘1’, and categorical aspects by integers in parentheses, 




Figure 16: A Peircean classification of sign aspects (a) and its process 
interpretation (b). In (a), the categorical aspect and category of a sign aspect is 
designated by a pair of integers, e.g., (2)1. In (b), neighboring sign aspects are 
connected by a horizontal edge. The types of interpretation events are depicted 
on the right-hand side of this diagram, in italics 








1 The relation of the sign to itself: (1) qualisign, (2) sinsign, (3) legisign. E.g., the 
perception of pain as (1) a quality, (2) an actual event occurring now, and (3) 
a habitual feeling. 
2 The relation of the sign to its object: (1) iconical, (2) indexical, (3) symbolic. 
E.g., pain interpreted as (1) a measure of a quality, (2) a pointer pointing to 
the teeth, and (3) a conventional concept such as a toothache. 
3 The relation of the sign to its interpretant: (1) rhematic, (2) dicentic or 
propositional, (3) argumentative. E.g., the perception of pain as (1) an 
abstract concept (cf. ‘pain’), (2) an actual existence of ‘pain’ in the teeth, and 
(3) a premise that we should call a dentist. 
The first triad in the above classification refers to the sign in itself hence to a 
category; the second and third to a relation involved in the sign hence to a 
categorical aspect. On the basis of their category, Peirce’s nine sign aspects can 
be arranged in a partial order (Walther, 1979), (Bense, 1976). See Fig. 16(a). 
References to sign aspects can be given by means of adjectival and nominal 
phrases that we use interchangeably.24  
The isomorphism between the partial order displayed in Fig. 16(b), and the 
cutting plane of the octahedron depicted in Fig. 14 (b), enables the definition of a 
mapping from our informational concepts (cf. Fig. 3) to Peircean sign aspects. For 
example, ‘neutral’ (qualities in themselves) can be mapped to the sign aspect 
qualisign, ‘constituent’ (co-existent qualities) to the sign aspect icon,25 
‘abstraction’ (abstract qualia) to the sign aspect rheme. 
 
6.2  Process model 
In earlier research (Sarbo et al., 2011), we have shown that Peirce’s classification 
of sign aspects can be interpreted as a process of interactions between 
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In Peircean theory, the kinds of references are used differently. An adjectival reference 
emphasizes the service rendered by the sign aspect, for example, iconic. This is opposed to a 
nominal, which is a reference to a sign, by a pars pro toto use of an aspect, e.g., icon (Van 
Breemen, pers. comm., 2012). 
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neighboring sign aspects. This is depicted in Fig. 16(b), in which neighboring sign 
aspects are connected by a horizontal edge. 
The input of this process is defined by the input qualia, interpreted as an 
expression of the qualisign sign aspect.26 Through sorting the input into a 
collection of state, and effect qualia, the input qualia are interpreted as an 
expression of the icon and sinsign sign aspects, respectively. By separating the 
two types of qualia from one another, in abstraction, the input qualia are 
interpreted as an expression of the rheme and legisign sign aspects. In 
complementation, the abstract state and effect is augmented with indexical 
information by the interpreting system, enabling an interpretation of the input 
qualia as an expression of the dicent and symbol sign aspects. By merging the 
last two representations, in predication, the input qualia are interpreted as an 
expression of the argument sign aspect.  
In the next section we delve into an analysis of Peirce’s theory of sign 
relations that themselves are signs, not just sign aspects. Our goal is to reveal the 
potential of our model for an aspectual representation of these more complex 
notions of the sign as well. 
 
6.3  The sign as an object 
Arguably the most important property of a process view of sign interpretation is 
its potential for considering the sign to be an object. The possibility of this 
perspective complies with Peirce’s theory of interpretation, as it is pointed out 
by van Breemen (van Breemen, 2012). Peirce writes (Peirce, 1992, 1998):27 
 
It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a quasi-mind; for if we 
regard it as an outward object, and as addressing itself to a human mind, 
that mind must first apprehend it as an object in itself, and only after that 
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 This, and all other expressions by this process are representations of sign aspects involved in the 
input interaction. 
27








consider it in its significance; and the like must happen if the sign addresses 
itself to any quasi-mind. It must begin by forming a determination of that 
quasi-mind, and nothing will be lost by regarding that determination as the 
sign.  
 
Peirce classified the significative effect of a sign in three types, which he called 
immediate, dynamic, and final or normal interpretant. His classification indicates 
a development in interpretation as a process (cf. levels), from immediate, 
through dynamic, to final. In this section we suggest that the above levels may 
apply to the apprehension of the sign as an object (‘sign-object’), as well. As, 
from an analytical perspective, the relations involved in triadic signs must be a 
result of interpretation, we must be able to characterize those relations from the 
perspective of the three levels of interpretation. 
Following our assumption of the sign to be an object, the firstness of the 
relation of the sign to itself may be associated with the ‘immediate’ 
representation (1) of the sign (S), (2) the sign of the immediate object (IO) and 
immediate interpretant (II), and (3) the sign of the dynamic object (DO), dynamic 
interpretant (DI), and final or normal interpretant (NI).28 The secondness of 
representation of the relation of the sign to its object may be associated with the 
more developed, ‘dynamic’ representations by the interpreting system: by the 
relation between the sign and its immediate object (cf. S–DO)29 and between the 
sign and its immediate (cf. S–DI) and dynamic interpretant (cf. S–NI), following 
information augmentation of the IO, II, and DI, respectively. Finally, the thirdness 
of the relation of the sign to its object and interpretant may be associated with 
the relation between the most developed, ‘final’ representation of the sign, 
object, and interpretant (cf. S–NI–DO), following a (final) information 
augmentation of the DO and DI.  
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The normal interpretant (NI) is the tendency of the final interpretant towards its limit. In this 
paper the two types of interpretant are used interchangeably. 
29
Following the above process view of interpretation, S–DO is a representation of the IO, 








An example of firstness sign relations is the phenomenon toothache, 
signified by unsorted qualia of a sensation of pain (S). Via interpretation we may 
generate a thought sign, e.g., ‘toothache’ (II), as a response on the perceived 
input qualia. By sorting the input in a form and event, we may conclude that the 
perceived qualia stand for pain in the dental area (IO). Our first or immediate 
interpretant may trigger more responses such as a motor reaction or an 
interpreting thought (DI), by means of knowledge by the interpreting system 
(observer). Examples are ‘toothache’, ‘call a dentist’, ‘make an appointment’, 
‘take an analgesic’, etc., representing increasingly more developed responses 
(DIs) on the input sign. The tendency of these responses (NI) can be paraphrased 
by the interpretant ‘stay calm, do what is necessary, e.g. take medication, 
consult a dentist’. 
We suggest that the above interpretation of the Peircean sign relations 
(Peirce, 1865–1909) can be used for the introduction of an aspectual 
representation of those relations. In the next section we show that Peirce’s sign 
relations can be mapped to categorical relations between sign aspects, as well as 
to relations involved by the octahedron structure, including its process 
interpretation. 
 
6.4  A representation of sign relations 
The 10 relations of the sign, that are themselves sign, are: S, IO, DO, II, DI, NI, S–
DO, S–DI, S–NI, S–NI–DO. An interpretation of these, more complex notions of 
the sign requires cyclic processing. To this end we make use of a result from 
(Sarbo et al., 2011), proving that processing of a single sign, and a series of signs 
can be modeled in an isomorphic fashion. The cycles enabled by a process, that 
has three types, first or initial, intermediate, and final, can be associated with the 
three levels of interpretation, immediate, dynamic, and final, respectively. Below 
we revisit our process model, depicted in Fig. 16(b), in order to reveal its 








to sign aspects by means of their Peircean term, for example, the qualisign sign 
aspect by the term ‘qualisign’.  
We begin our analysis with the first event in sign processing, which is the 
definition of the input for processing. As a consequence of the possibility of the 
sign to be an object, the representation of the input by the qualisign sign aspect 
(S) must be an expression of the immediate object of interpretation (IO), as well. 
See Fig. 17. 
 
  
Figure 17: Sign relations mapped to categorical relations between sign aspects, 
and to relations between stages of q2*q1. For instance, IO can be mapped to a 
relation between rheme, icon, and qualisign, and to the relation (3)1-(2)1-(1)1. 
 
In sorting, the representation of a relation between the input state and effect, by 
the sinsign sign aspect (S), is also an expression of the event involved in the 
immediate interpretant (II). An expression of the above relation, this time from 
the perspective of constituency, by the icon sign aspect, amounts to a more 
developed expression of the sign-object (IO), as well as a representation of the 
initial value of information augmentation (S-DO). Finally, the representation of 
the above relation by the index sign aspect, as a pointer to complementary 
information about the input state and effect, is also an expression of a 
development in the process of information augmentation, both as a value (S–
DO), and an event (II).  
In abstraction, the input sign is represented by the legisign sign aspect, 








augmentation of the habitual relation involved in the input sign (DO). A 
representation of the input by the rheme sign aspect, is an expression of the 
sign-object as an abstract state (IO). This state being the subject of 
interpretation, the rheme is also an expression of the initial value of that process 
(S–NI). 
In complementation, the representation of the sign-object is augmented 
from immediate to dynamical. This is witnessed by a representation of the sign’s 
object (cf. legisign; DO) and interpretant (cf. rheme; S–NI). If the current 
processing cycle is a final one, the above representation of the interpretant can 
be used as a representation of the final or normal interpretant (S–NI); otherwise, 
more cycle(s) may be required hence that representation must be an expression 
of the dynamic interpretant (S–DI). 
In predication, augmented representations of the sign-object (S–NI, DO) 
are combined into a single representation. This is expressed as the final input 
representation (S–NI–DO), if the current cycle is a final one. If it is not, the above 
representation is offered as input for further processing by the next cycle (S–
DI).30 
A mapping of the remaining four relations (DI, S–NI, NI, S–NI–DO) to 
vertices of the octahedron can be defined as follows. If the current cycle is not 
the final one (i.e., further processing is required), the current augmentation of 
the interpretant (S–DI) may become a sign-object (cf. qualisign) in the next cycle, 
in order for a generation of the final interpretant (S–NI). Otherwise, the sign-
object must involve information about a final approximation of the expression of 
the dynamic interpretant. This information can be represented as an abstract 
‘state’, by the rheme sign aspect (DI), and as a habitual ‘event’, by the legisign 
sign aspect (NI). The process may terminate, by generating a representation of 
the relation between the sign, its object, and interpretant, following (a final) 
information augmentation (S–NI–DO).  
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According to the above analysis, the relations, DI, S–NI, NI, S–NI–DO, can 
be mapped to a single sign aspect of Peirce’s classification, as well as to a single 
node of the cutting plane of the octahedron. The above mapping can be 
extended to a categorical relation. To this end we observe that, by virtue of the 
involvement of the above four relations in the information augmentation 
process, those relations may represent properties of the interpreting system 
itself. We also notice that the octahedron may represent relations involved in 
action–reaction phenomena in three ways: as a firstness (cf. ‘action’), a 
secondness (cf. cutting plane), and a thirdness (cf. ‘reaction’). From this, we may 
conclude that a categorical relation of the above four notions can be defined by 
completing their mapping by a first and a third element, represented by the 
nodes ‘action’, and ‘reaction’, respectively. See Fig. 18. 
This completes our analysis of a relation between a Newtonian model of 
action–reaction phenomena and Peirce’s theory of signs. Our model is restricted 
to relational interpretation (cf. secondness). A representation of sign 




Figure 18: A mapping of DI, S–DI, NI, S–NI–DO, to relations of the octahedron, 
e.g., S–DI is mapped to the relation ‘action’–qualisign–‘reaction’ 
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Through representing the relation involved in firstness and thirdness, by a single node, the 








7  Summary 
We suggest that a model of meaningful information processing can be given by 
introducing a model of action–reaction phenomena and embedding it in a 
Peircean theory of signs. Following Peirce, we assume that phenomena, as well 
as their representations by relations can be distinguished in three categories. 
Peirce maintained that from his categories everything else, including his signs 
and sign aspects, can be derived. In this paper we show that our model has the 
potential of representing three types of relation, consisting of 10, 28, and 66 
elements, that are analogous to Peirce’s three classifications of signs. This 
implies the possibility of a common representation for Peirce’s different 
classifications. Peirce’s sign theory is considered by many to be a theory of the 
knowable (the types of distinction that can be signified by signs). By virtue of the 
above relation with Peircean semiotics, and because of the fundamental nature 
of signs, our approach has the potential for a uniform modeling of information 
processing in any domain, theoretically. Past research in natural language 
processing, ‘naive’ logic and ‘naive’ reasoning has shown that the above 
hypothesis may hold, and that the developed models may be practical as well.  
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